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EVIL IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 
THEOLOGICAL CURRENTS 
 
RUSSELL RE MANNING 
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter traces the central dynamics of Christian theological perspectives on evil in 
the early twentieth century. Using a later framework from Paul Ricoeur, the chapter 
distinguishes four “myths” of evil - the Christian theological “Adamic” and three 
alternatives: “chaos”, “tragedy” and “embodiment”. The chapter argues that the classical 
Augustinian perspective on evil that the twentieth century inherits contains three basic 
points of tension, regarding sin, privation and theodicy. It further argues that resurgences 
of the alternative myths of evil put further pressures on the classical Christian account of 
evil, leading to the development of significant new theological perspectives that seek to 
integrate the insights of the alternative myths of evil into the Adamic account. The chapter 
briefly considers in this framework the proposals of three theological giants of the period, 
Karl Rahner, Paul Tillich and Karl Barth. 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
“If there is one human experience ruled by myth, it is certainly that of evil”  
Paul Ricoeur, ‘Evil’ in Encyclopedia of Religion (ed.) Mircea Eliade (1987), V. 199. 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE CHRISTIAN THEOLOGICAL MYTH OF EVIL 
I begin with some general remarks about the Christian theological perspective on evil. 
Christian theologians have traditionally approached discussions of evil through the lens 
of what Paul Ricoeur calls the “Adamic myth” that seeks to locate the origin of evil in an 
anthropological fall from a pristine created paradise (Ricoeur 1987: 203). By developing 
a particular interpretation of the Genesis narrative of the disobedience of Adam (and 
Eve), the Christian tradition has tended towards a view on evil that separates it from the 
original divine act of creation and places responsibility for evil upon humanity (a position 
that has its philosophical outworking in the distinction, vital for Kant and almost all moral 
philosophy since, between “natural” and “moral” evil). On the basis of this Adamic myth 
Page 2 of 17 
 
of the origin of evil, Christian theologians have developed a particular interpretation of 
the theological and ontological character of evil, as well as a characteristic ambivalence 
about the appropriate way to respond theologically to evil. The former concerns the 
distinctive Christian discussions of sin and of the non-being of evil. The latter finds 
expression in the uncertain hesitation between what Ricoeur calls “the path of theodicy” 
and “the path of wisdom” (Ricoeur 1987: 204). 
Before developing these three points (sin, non-being, and theodicy) in further detail, it is 
helpful briefly to contextualise the Christian “myth” of evil. Whilst acknowledging that 
there are significant overlaps between the different perspectives, Ricoeur helpfully 
distinguishes between three alternatives to the Christian mythological imagination of 
evil. These we can characterise as myths of chaos, tragedy, and embodiment. According 
to the first perspective, evil arises as the result of the primordial cosmic victory of order 
over chaos; evil is the residue of unordered chaos present in the world notwithstanding 
the imposition of order. On this view, the world is thoroughly ambiguous and forever 
flawed by the persistence of chaos. Evil is thus an unavoidable fact about the world; 
natural and ubiquitous; and to be resisted (and potentially overcome in the future) by the 
ongoing activity of ordering.  
For the second perspective, by contrast, evil is more thoroughly interwoven into the 
fabric of reality as an unavoidable, if tragic, aspect of the world. Evil, on this view, is not 
opposed to order as such (indeed as Hannah Arendt (1963) makes explicit in her account 
of the tragic nature of evil, order can as easily nurture evil as it can resist it), but is 
identified with the insurmountable negativity of life. Dramatised in the Greek tragedies, 
such as Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, as Ricoeur puts it, “the tragic myth produced a 
spectacle, rather than a speculation, a spectacle that makes the spectators participate 
through the catharsis of the emotions of terror and pity” (1987: 202). 
The third perspective differs importantly from the first two in that it identifies the origin 
of evil in the act of creation, rather than assuming the eternity of evil as either chaos or 
tragic flaw. Associated with the Platonists (and neo-Platonists), this view finds the source 
of evil in the imprisonment of a pristine ideal reality in the physical. Just as the immortal 
soul inhabits the corruptible body, so the eternal pre-existent goodness of reality is 
tainted by the fall into actuality. This approach has been given more recent philosophical 
articulation in the existentialist tradition that promotes “resoluteness” and “authenticity” 
in the face of the indissoluble presence of evil to reality. Thus, evil is identified with 
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existence itself and the appropriate response to such an awareness is to seek to escape 
from the conditions of being to “return” to the essential unblemished ideality. 
Of course, the Christian “Adamic” perspective shares some aspects of these alternatives 
(and indeed has been variously synthesised with versions of all three at different times) 
yet it differs markedly in its unflinching refusal either to grant evil primordial status (as 
is the case for the first two) or to locate it as a consequence of creation itself (as in the 
embodiment myth). Instead, Christian accounts of evil insist that the origin of evil lies 
within creation in the human historical act of disobedience to God (of sin); that as a result, 
evil has no “positive” ontological status; and that evil can only – indeed has only been 
overcome by a free act of God. 
THE CLASSIC AUGUSTINIAN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY PERSPECTIVE ON EVIL 
Augustine provides the classic statement of this Christian theological perspective on evil 
(Evans 1982) and one which is broadly accepted by theologians in the first half of the 
twentieth century, although with interesting qualifications as we shall see. Explicitly 
interpreting the Genesis narrative of the fall of Adam, Augustine answers the question of 
the origin of evil by pointing to the uncompelled will of the first man to turn away from 
God and to elevate himself above his creator. On this Augustine is clear: humanity is 
responsible for the coming of evil; the corruption of creation is the result of human sin. 
Importantly, though, Augustine is also clear about the further question: why did Adam 
choose to sin? To this Augustine affirms that the only appropriate answer is ignorance: 
no reason can be given to explain the evil will that chose to disobey God, indeed one must 
not attempt to justify that decision, as to do so would be to qualify evil as in some sense a 
lesser good. The reason for the Fall is a mystery and must remain such (Brown 1978). Sin, 
then, is inscrutable and impenetrable; there can be no excuse offered for the terrible 
crime of disobedience. Further, the effects of sin are universal such that all of creation 
(originally good) is infected with evil. Thus, insomuch as we are creatures of God, we are 
created good (even in God’s image) and yet, as fallen, we are thoroughly corrupted. To 
exist is a good – the existence of the sinner is a good and thus the sinner is a worthy object 
of love – and yet evil has a hold over all that is. As such, no created thing is “pure evil” and 
yet nothing escapes the taint of negativity that Adam’s fall initiated. Theologically, then, 
evil is a surd; an outrage that incomprehensively sets creation against God. Evil is thus 
not of God nor a cosmic force to rival God, but instead it is apart from God; homeless in 
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the impossible place of distance from God. From this theological perspective, evil is 
untruth; it is the “murderous lie” (Jüngel 2008:704, referring to John 8.44) of the denial 
of the unsulliable goodness of God. 
It is in this way that Augustine’s account of the ontological status of evil resembles and 
yet differs importantly from the neo-Platonic account of Plotinus by which he was greatly 
influenced. Augustine shares with Plotinus the firm conviction that evil has no positive 
ontological status: it is “non-being” or thoroughgoing privation. However, whilst Plotinus 
equates the coming into existence of the material world as a fall from the plenitude of 
being (the One) towards the non-being of inanimate “dead” matter, Augustine exempts 
none of the created world from full participation in God’s goodness. God is, in Augustine’s 
vision, equally proximal to all of His creation, such that the non-being that is the ontology 
of evil is not one of distance (as in Plotinus’ image of ripples spreading from a pebble 
dropped in water and steadily dissipating), but instead one of refusal. Here, the theology 
of the untruth of evil is once again apparent: the evil of evil is its touting of its loss of being 
as a gain in being. Hence, evil, from this Christian theological perspective is not simply 
the lack of goodness (the evil will is not simply the failure to act according to the good) 
but is non-being (the evil will is the paradoxical act of opting for that which is not). 
Finally, and this is perhaps the key-stone of the classical Christian account of evil as 
exemplified by Augustine, the consequence of evil results in a thoroughly ambiguous 
situation. It is fundamental to Christianity that God, in Christ, overcomes evil in an 
ongoing act of new creation, in which Jesus Christ reverses the Adamic fall and humanity 
is saved from sin. As such, in some sense at least, the basic narrative of Christianity is a 
theodicy, albeit one in which the gratuity of God’s saving act is never compromised by 
rational necessity. It is thus no surprise that theodical arguments have been central to the 
Christian tradition, even before the modern formulation of the “problem of evil” and its 
responses. However, at the same time, it is equally basic to Christian theology that it is a 
mistake to interpret God’s saving revelation in Jesus Christ as an “answer” to anything 
whatsoever; to do so is to misdirect the economy of salvation. Jesus is not the “second 
Adam” by virtue of being a solution to the lapsed state of existence brought about by 
human malfeasance, instead it is only in the light of God’s redemptive work in Christ that 
the extent of human fallenness is made manifest. In other words, the Christian gospel 
brings both liberation and judgement. 
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TENSIONS IN THE CLASSICAL CHRISTIAN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In broad terms, the Augustinian account of evil provided the basic framework for 
Christian theological perspectives on evil in the first half of the twentieth century. Within 
this framework though three points of tension can be identified at each of the central loci 
of the account (sin, privation and theodicy) and it is these tensions that are central to the 
distinctive character of early twentieth-century theological writings on evil. 
The account of sin given within Christian writings on evil generates the first significant 
tension for such a classical theological perspective. In essence, the Christian account of 
the origin of evil in sin, interpreted as the incomprehensible first will away from God, sets 
up an ambiguity of responsibility. Humanity is portrayed as responsible for the Fall, 
symbolised in the free uncompelled Adamic choice to disobey God’s prohibitions. Yet the 
very lack of rational justification suggests that no reasons can be given for the Fall and it 
is by no means clear that Adam can be blamed for that which he cannot comprehend. By 
consistently striving to absolve God of any responsibility for evil, yet affirming his 
absolute sovereignty over his creation, Christian theological perspectives on evil tie 
themselves into the knot of at once ascribing responsibility for the Fall to humanity (the 
fault lies with Adam and not with God) and at the same time exempting the Fall from 
explanation (that which is explicable is “comprehended” by God). In short, as sinful, 
humanity is both culpable and able to plead ignorance. 
The second point of tension in the classical Christian account of evil lies in its conviction 
that evil is characterised ontologically as privation in the form of a withdrawal from God. 
Here the key concern is whether evil is wholly negative and as such not at all of God or 
whether the withdrawal from God is the realisation of a loss potentially given to creation. 
The assertion of evil as privation seems, in other words, to demand both that it be wholly 
other from all that is and, as such, qualitatively unrelated to all that is (which seems 
ironically to elevate evil into an impenetrable and thus sovereign other to being) and that 
it be dialectically related to all that is precisely as its negation (and thus has existence, at 
least potentially, within creation). 
The final tension lies in the ambiguity already mentioned between theodicy and wisdom; 
between the Christian theological assertion that God in Christ has overcome evil and the 
simultaneous theological conviction that what is required in the face of evil is not triumph 
but the cultivation of wisdom. The plurality of models of the atonement is itself indicative 
of this basic ambiguity in Christian accounts of evil – from triumphalist images of Christus 
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victor to compassionate depictions of Christ as the suffering servant (both of which 
received renewed attention in the first half of the twentieth century). Beyond this 
soteriological instability, however, this ambiguity generates a tension for Christian 
accounts of how to respond in the face of evil. On the one hand, Christian theology affirms 
that the problem of evil (whether formulated as a logical puzzle or an existential 
challenge to faith) is answerable – the Christian narrative as a whole is the definitive 
theodicy able to provide a morally sufficient reason for God’s permitting of evil, namely 
the love shown in his revelation in Christ. On the other hand, Christian theologians tend 
to side with the figure of Job against his theodicising comforters: God’s ways are 
mysterious and the risen Christ still bears the marks of his crucifixion. In both cases, the 
hesitation between the theodical impulse to justify evil and the counsel of wisdom to 
learn to accept evil sustains the defining tension within Christian theological ethics and 
political theology, namely whether to work tirelessly to combat evil or whether to strive 
to trust faithfully in God’s redemptive work. 
EXACERBATING AND RESOLVING THE TENSIONS BY EXPANDING THE CHRISTIAN 
MYTH OF EVIL 
Whilst these three points of tension characterise Christian theological accounts of evil in 
every period of their development, they become particularly acute in the early twentieth 
century under the impact of the rise of alternative non-theological or non-Christian 
accounts of evil. Returning to Ricoeur’s four myths of evil, it is helpful to correlate each of 
the tensions outlined above to alternative myths of evil and to indicate how the intrusion 
of elements from the different myths both serves to exacerbate the tensions in the 
Christian theological account and provides resources for the resolution of these tensions. 
Where the revival of alternative myths of evil threatens to pull apart the Christian myth 
by exacerbating its internal tensions one of the poles of contention is overemphasised, 
such that the dynamic instability of a tension tips over into a contradiction. Counterwise, 
when alternative accounts of evil are used as resources to resolve the tensions in the 
Christian myth, this resolution is achieved by re-conceiving the poles as dialectically 
inter-dependent and thus no longer destructively competitive. 
SIN & CHAOS IN EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 
To take the points of tension once again in order: sin, privation, and theodicy. The basic 
tension of the indeterminacy of sin is given new impetus in the early twentieth century 
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under the impact of the rise of Freudian psychology and its emphasis on an 
uncontrollable subconscious that lies behind what superficially appears to be the rational 
self. The idea of the operative influence on thoughts and behaviour of a pre-rational drive 
can be seen as a revived form of Ricoeur’s chaos myth of evil; human life is recast as 
thetheatre of the rational self’s struggle to impose order upon an always unsuppressable 
chaos. Reflected in the artistic movements of cubism, surrealism, and indeed certain 
forms of abstraction, the idea of humanity as culpably sinful is robustly rejected in the 
wider culture of the early twentieth century in favour of a vision of humanity as 
constantly at the mercy of an uncontrollably chaotic subconscious (indeed often 
conceived of as a creative gift). In this light, the Christian theological attempt to assert 
human culpability for evil seems increasingly unrealistic and restrictive. Far from the 
free-wheeling anthropology of the creative ferment of life as a stream of consciousness, 
the theological insistence on responsibility for sin comes to be associated with a narrowly 
rationalistic and paternalistic account of the human person. In order to combat the 
permissive irrationalism of modern psychology and the chaos myth of evil that it 
repristinates, the Christian theological account came to overemphasise the pole of sinful 
culpability, which then becomes impossible to reconcile with the equally Christian 
theological insistence on the incomprehensibility of sin. In essence, with the 
imcomprehensibility of sin lost to the chaos myth, Christian theology distorts itself to 
promote the idea of sin as guilt precisely at the moment when the wider culture within 
which theology is articulated has lost confidence in the rationalist anthropology that is 
necessary to sustain such an account.  
At the same time, the revival of forms of the chaos myth of evil can serve to resource a 
Christian theological account of evil. Crucial here is the idea that the unavoidable 
presence of the chaotic within an otherwise seemingly ordered world serves to 
undermine any strong accounts of both rationalism and irrationalism. If, as both the 
human sciences and the physical sciences increasingly seem to argue during the 
twentieth century, the order that we seem to perceive is sustained (and thus constituted) 
by a radically chaotic substrate or highly complex systems that defy linear articulation, 
then the Christian theological tension between the Fall as the culpable human act and as 
incomprehensible is dissolved. What a chaos account of evil can give to a Christian 
theological one, in other words, is the insight that the Fall can be the result of a deformed 
will that is neither wholly culpable nor wholly incomprehensible. Indeed, the realisation 
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of evil can be seen to be an unfortunate necessity entailed in the very act of resisting it. 
Unlike a pristine Platonic realm of Forms, the (real) world on such a view is marked by a 
persistent chaos that eternally resists the attempts to eradicate it by the imposition of 
order, precisely because order is itself constituted by chaos. Thus, the utopian Kantian 
vision of a transparently rational ethical commonwealth in which evil is overcome by the 
perfect coincidence of human will with human reason is dislodged by the more realist 
Kantian insistence upon the “crooked timber of humanity” that both absolves us of our 
moral failure and holds us to account as guilty. 
In early twentieth-century theology, the position that comes closest to realising the 
constructive possibility for Christian theology of evil of the incorporation of the chaos 
myth is that of the Catholic theologian Karl Rahner (1904–1984). For Rahner, in the light 
of modern psychology, the twentieth-century mind can no longer grasp the idea of real 
guilt and responsibility. Instead of self-affliction, Rahner perceives that his 
contemporaries are more inclined to think that the “absurdity and universal misery” of 
human life is due to an evil fate to which humans are subject than that it is due to an act 
for which they are themselves somehow responsible. Rahner’s response – driven by a 
desire to make the idea of “man as a sinner” credible to the modern mind – is to dissolve 
the polar opposition of guilt and innocence by proposing the idea of the “transcendental 
nature of sin” (Rahner 1978). Extending the Kantian analysis of humanity as subject to 
certain conditions, which whilst never demonstrably provable must be assumed in order 
for us to be the way that we seem to be, Rahner suggests that humanity is characterised 
by a radical freedom that in turn permits an equally radical bondage. 
Rahner distinguishes between two senses of freedom: on the one hand freedom of choice, 
such as the freedom to choose between two finite objects or alternatives, and on the other 
freedom of disposing of the self before God. For Rahner, the human freedom for God is 
precisely not a freedom of choice – as though there were a range of alternatives to chose 
from– and as such can never be demonstrated empirically. Rather, it must be assumed as 
the condition for the freedom to choose; a condition that is itself dependent on the free 
act of divine grace that gives to humanity the possibility of a free, subjective “yes” or “no” 
to God. It is in this sense that the transcendental idea of freedom supports the contention 
that the nature of human freedom is not best captured as a purely autonomous self-
determination, but instead is grounded in the possibility of a decision for or against God. 
In other words, contrary to the dominant assumptions of the twentieth century, human 
Page 9 of 17 
 
freedom is not a morally or soteriologically neutral phenomenon, but is always marked 
by that which determines it, namely the possibility of a fidelity to or a rejection of God. 
Further, the transcendental freedom towards God is not itself a neutral possibility that 
could equally well be fulfilled in a decision for God as in a decision against. Instead for 
Rahner, it is freedom’s destiny or nature that it be realised in a human decision to accept 
God’s gift of self-revelation. 
However, whilst for Rahner transcendental human freedom is fulfilled in its decision for 
God, the possibility of a “no” to God remains unextinguishable within human nature, such 
that the decision to have faith in God is at the same time “in the most radical way the 
capacity to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to God” (1978: 101). Thanks to the instability of 
transcendental freedom, in the persistence of the chaotic possibility of the denial of 
freedom in its very condition, humanity is both culpably responsible for its failure 
definitively to decide for God and yet incapable of doing so without denying the very 
freedom that would make such a decision possible. Evil, in other words is both the result 
of culpable human sin and the unavoidable consequence of the nature of reality. 
PRIVATION & EMBODIMENT IN EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 
The basic tension inherent in the second element of the Christian theological myth of evil 
is that between evil as an absolute privation and as an unrealised potential within 
creation. If the Christian claim is that evil is without being because uncreated by God, then 
the question becomes whether its stands wholly apart from creation or whether it is in 
some way derived from creation. In the first half of the twentieth century this tension 
became exacerbated under the influence of a revival of the embodiment myth of evil in 
the form of the anxiety-stricken protest of existentialism. From the existentialist 
perspective, the coincidence of creation and fall is apparent in the absurdity of a life lived 
towards death. For Heidegger (1962) and later Sartre (2007), the problem of evil is 
identified with the problem of finitude – a predicament that seems both unavoidable and 
insurmountable. If to be is to be thrown towards death, then evil is, in effect, a constitutive 
characteristic of existence itself. Far from the absolute privation of the Christian account, 
on this view, evil is all too present in the very fact of finitude.  
The danger of such a development for Christian theological accounts of evil is twofold. On 
the one hand, Christian theology risks being associated with an otherworldly ignoring of 
the very real sufferings and anxieties of the age. Talk of privation and the non-being of 
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evil may suggest a reluctance to accept the “reality” of evil and a privileged nostalgia for 
the comfortable rectory gardens that caricatures of William Paley’s naively optimistic 
natural theology routinely invoke. Unable to accommodate itself to the harsh 
uncompromising Darwinian world struggle of a world (and not just a nature) “red in 
tooth and claw”, theological accounts of evil seem to retreat to highly abstracted 
ontological speculations that can have nothing to say to the modern era. On the other 
hand, there is a danger in those Christian theological responses to this challenge that 
attempt robustly to respond to the reality of evil by abandoning the privation account as 
a piece of antiquated metaphysics and turning instead to particular worldly phenomena 
as manifestations of evil. Of course, the overly close alignment of theological prophetic 
critique to historical realities is a persistent and recurring problem for theology. From 
Babylon in the Old Testament to “the Jews” in the New Testament and the Muslim infidels 
for mediaeval crusaders, theologians have long been quick to identify evil in particular 
embodiments; indeed, the polemics of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation 
provide a vivid illustration of the theological tendency to assert the very tangible 
embodiment of evil. In the early twentieth century, this move reccurs with a particular 
vengeance in response to the (broad) existentialist identification of evil with existence by 
suggesting particular specific targets for evil, be those the capitalist oppressors of the 
masses, the revolutionary disrupters of the status quo, whichever foreign nation is at odds 
with that of the author, and – most disturbingly for the future course of evil in the 
twentieth century – the Jews . As Robert Ericksen’s (1985) analysis strikingly 
demonstrates, in light of the broad acceptance of the existentialist protest, twentieth-
century theologians have few resources available to them to respond to the real 
manifestation of evil when it takes hold in the form of the Nazi programme of the “final 
solution” yet plenty of energy available to rail at the usual suspects by invoking the sadly 
traditional theological motif of demonization, a move that (perhaps unsurprisingly given 
the ethical-political trajectory of Heidegger’s thought) sits well with the existential turn 
of early twentieth-century philosophy. 
An alternative, more constructive, yet equally radical, response to this situation is to 
extend the embodiment myth, as it were, such that God himself is no longer free from the 
taint of evil. Of course, the intention is not to compromise the omnibenevolence of the 
divine nature, but rather to predicate that nature precisely on an overcoming of an always 
unavoidable possibility of evil. In other words, God is not God because He is without evil; 
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but rather because He perfectly and absolutely overcomes evil – a victory that is repeated 
within finitude, subject to its conditions.  
The early twentieth-century theologian who most develops this perspective is the 
Lutheran Paul Tillich (1886–1965). Tillich is often thought of as an existentialist 
theologian and he famously affirmed existentialism as “the good luck of theology” and yet, 
in important ways, Tillich’s theological project is a sustained rejection of the existentialist 
identification of evil with existence. For Tillich, existence is characterised as 
“estrangement” or a separation from that which is its creating and sustaining “ground”. 
And yet, such estrangement can never be total: to be is to be conditioned and as such is 
to participate in “being-itself”, which is unconditioned. Thus Tillich’s affirmation that 
Creation and Fall coincide is precisely the opposite of the existentialist condemnation of 
existence as absurd, but is instead a theological affirmation of the worth of existence as 
divinely created. This is a Romantic-Idealist theology that takes Ricoeur’s embodiment 
myth of evil right into the heart of a Christian perspective on evil. This is not to say that, 
for Tillich, existence is unambiguous – as in MacKinnon’s (1979) interpretation of Tillich 
as the theologian of the Weimar Republic consciously denying the tragic in favour of an 
idealised theoretical quick-fix – in fact, on the contrary, for Tillich, existence is riven with 
ambiguity, with “the demonic” as well as “the kairotic” present throughout. Evil is not 
identified with existence itself but it is an avoidable reality within existence. 
Decisively influenced at this point by Schelling, Tillich’s perspective on evil is itself 
grounded in his distinctive doctrine of God as a dynamic, living God in whom the power 
of non-being is both acknowledged and overcome. For Tillich, if God is to be anything 
more than an abstract principle (and thus soteriologcally ineffective) without being 
thought of as a being (and thus subject to finitude’s conditions), then God must be 
characterised in terms of life. Fundamental to life is the idea of a dynamic movement; in 
the case of God, this is the movement from non-being to being; God, in other words, must 
initiate non-being (thereby “actualising” its power) if He is to “become” being-itself. A 
radical mono-theism, Tillich’s doctrine of God rejects the idea that anything – including 
non-being – can be “outside” of God, who as ultimate reality “grounds” all existence, 
including His own. Non-being is thus not presented as an antagonist to God, but rather is, 
as it were, realised by God in His own self-actualisation. In other words, God is creator of 
all, including non-being – and thus of evil. That this dynamic is not unstable is the 
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achievement of Tillich’s re-casting of the Trinitarian nature of God, according to which 
the Holy Spirit is held to be the power of reconciliation within the divine life.  
THEODICY & TRAGEDY IN EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 
The theological engagement with evil has long struggled to reconcile the divergent 
intuitions that the Christian gospel is both a theodicy and a path to wisdom and this 
tension became particularly exacerbated in the early twentieth century as a result of what 
might be called the disintegration of the religious imagination. Whilst the question of the 
history of “the secularization of the European mind” can easily descend into academic 
parlour games, it is undeniable that the early twentieth century was marked not only by 
institutional and epistemic secularisation, but perhaps more decisively by a cultural 
secularisation that had the effect of splitting apart religion and culture with a previously 
unprecedented intensity. In both the sciences and the arts, the issue of autonomy was 
paramount – and as the assertion of “autonomy for” tends to be predicated on “autonomy 
from” – this entailed a widespread resistance to religious “interference” in culture. As a 
result, the very possibility of Christian theology as, in Ricoeur’s words a “spectacle” rather 
than a “speculation” comes under threat and alternative, secular enactments of the tragic 
myth of evil become more and more compelling to a cultural imagination increasingly 
tone-deaf to Christian imagery. From the sciences, of course, the most striking secular 
narration of evil as tragic myth came from the presentation of Darwinian evolution by 
natural selection as the explanation of life with all its lamentable yet unavoidable 
imperfections. As a result of Huxley and Haeckel’s transmission of Darwin’s ideas beyond 
the strict confines of evolutionary biology, Darwinism acquired the cultural status, in 
effect, of a tragic myth of evil for a scientific age (Alexander and Numbers 2010). Likewise, 
the emergence of “modern art” (essentially a twentieth-century category) brings the idea 
that the aesthetic has definitively divorced itself from the religious. Beyond even the 
Romantic aspiration that art might replace religion as the principal conveyer of 
transcendence, the modernist agenda is to leave ideas of transcendence behind in a total 
concentration upon the artwork itself. In a similar vein, the emergence in the course of 
the early twentieth century of the now dominant style of “analytic” philosophy is of one 
piece with the desire to separate culture from religion by systematically restricting the 
domain of philosophy from the expansive theologically-engaged nineteenth-century 
idealisms and post-idealisms. In this latter case, evil, when it is thought of at all, is 
Page 13 of 17 
 
marshalled into the narrowly constrictive form of “the problem of evil” – the exercise of 
resolving an apparent dilemma using purely philosophical resources. As a result, just as 
culture and religion are pulled apart and the opportunities for mutual engagement are 
denied, so too in the case of the question of evil, the contrasting tendencies towards 
theodicy and wisdom are wrenched asunder. 
The danger of such a situation for theological perspectives on evil is primarily that of the 
acceptance of the disjunction of religion and culture and the corresponding temptation 
to retreat into religion as the assumed natural home of theology and thereby to leave off 
any form of “theological spectacle” whatsoever. In its most extreme, this approach tends 
to an ascetic withdrawal from the idea of theology as apologetics and promotes the notion 
that theology be identified with religious practice or with a re-engagement with its own 
tradition. Such a cloistering of theology, whilst an attempt to seek wisdom in response to 
evil rather than to articulate a theodicy, in fact delivers neither simply because it fails to 
engage with the cultural “problem” of evil on its own terms at all. If evil is recast as a 
problem solely within and for Christian life and its theology, then the potential 
contribution of the perspective provided by the tragic myth is wholly obscured (as indeed 
it is for the purely philosophical dilemma-crunching). Located exclusively as an internal 
religious matter, evil can have no tragic dimension within Christian theology. In stark 
contrast to the image of the Promethean tragic hero, Kierkegaard’s account of Abraham 
as the “founder of faith” exercised a great influence on much early twentieth-century 
theological thinking about evil. For Kierkegaard, the tragic is essentially a moral category, 
whilst the “knight of faith” transcends morality in the steadfast pursuit of the religious 
life. There is no tragedy in the story of Abraham’s near sacrifice of his son, Isaac, as 
Kierkegaard retells it in Fear and Trembling (1843), only the unstinting affirmation of 
faith. If tragedy is motivated by a combination of the unbending outworking of heartless 
fate and the proud boastings of those who think that they can outwit the moirai (the 
Fates), then Christian faith consists precisely in the “resignation” of the believer to the 
mysterious yet utterly transformative divine purposes. That Abraham should be 
condemned as a murderer within a secular court of law – saved only by the lucky 
appearance of a ram caught in the thorn bushes – is irrelevant to Kierkegaard’s account. 
Tragedy has no role in such a theological account of evil, in which everything is 
subordinated to the uniquely religious attitude of faith. 
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There is, however, an alternative theological perspective in which the resignation of faith 
remains the starting point for theology, but also combines a critique of religion with an 
appreciation of the role of the tragic in theological thinking about evil. In the early 
twentieth century this stance is best developed by the Swiss Reformed theologian, Karl 
Barth (1886–1968). Barth’s leading role in the development of “neo-orthodoxy” or 
“dialectical” theology in the early years of the twentieth century may seem to align him 
with a strongly counter-cultural position and, indeed, his robust dismissal of the 
legitimacy of any form of natural theology certainly supports this characterisation. For 
Barth, theology is always responsive first and foremost to the revealed Word of God in 
Jesus Christ as witnessed to in Scripture and is undertaken in the service of the Church as 
“dogmatics”. However, whilst Barth’s theology is no “theology of culture”, this by no 
means indicates that he sides with the alternative pole of religion. Rather, Barth’s critique 
of religion is as fierce as his critique of culture – if not more so, given that religion commits 
the higher sin of standing in for revelation. Thus, whilst Barth has no intention to answer 
the cultural-philosophical question of evil in its own terms – and distort theological terms 
and concepts out of shape in the process – neither does he deny the tragic a place within 
a dogmatic theological perspective on evil.  
In Church Dogmatics 3/3 (first published in 1950, but part of his magnum opus begun in 
1936), Barth identifies evil with “nothingness” (das Nichtige) and develops a complex 
(and, to be honest, confusing) account of it as contradiction and opposition, what he calls 
a “disruptive element”, that “can never be considered or mentioned together in the same 
context as other objects of God’s providence.” (1960: 289) For Barth, nothingness is not 
part of creation and yet he writes of it forcing itself into creation, notably in its “concrete 
form” as sin. (310) And yet, there is more to nothingness than sin, otherwise nothingness 
would simply be a part of creation. In effect what Barth is arguing is that the reality of 
nothingness exceeds creation (it is not simply to be equated with sin, as in some 
interpretations of the Augustinian account that seek to lay total responsibility for evil at 
the feet of humanity) and yet is no threat to the absolute sovereignty of God. Thus 
nothingness does not exist, in the sense that created things exist, and yet Barth insists 
that “nothingness ‘is’…in its connexion with the activity of God. It ‘is’ because and as and 
so long as God is against it”. (353). Thus, God is “the basis and Lord of nothingness” (351) 
as creation’s other “from which God separates himself and in the face of which He asserts 
Himself and exerts His positive will”. (351) As such, in his attempt to avoid either 
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trivialising evil as a created phenomenon or over-evaluating evil as a pre-existent reality 
alongside God, Barth seems to accept  the tragic account that accepts God as the cause of 
evil (nothingness). 
Barth acknowledges that in his account evil in the form of nothingness has an “ontic 
peculiarity” (353) impenetrable to our “common logic” (351) such that it is finally not 
fully satisfactory as a coherent theodicy. Yet, where Barth’s account fails as speculation, 
it succeeds as a spectacle that attempts at least to enact theologically the Biblical picture 
of evil, in which God rules with both His right and His left hands. For instance, whilst 
Tillich invokes the category of “the demonic” to articulate “antidivine forces in individual 
and social life” (Tillich 1963: 102), Barth talks unapologetically in the New Testament 
language of “demons”. He argues that it is a fundamental mistake to compare demons to 
angels, insisting that the two have nothing whatsoever in common: 
“The demons are the opponents of the heavenly ambassadors of God, as the latter 
are the champions of the kingdom of heaven and therefore the kingdom of God on 
earth. Angels and demons are related as creation and chaos, as the free grace of 
God and nothingness, as good and evil, as life and death, as the light of revelation 
and the darkness which will not receive it, as redemption and perdition, as 
kerygma and myth.” (Barth 1960: 520) 
For Barth, such a relation is precisely that of a dialectical opposition with no possible 
mediatory analogy. The God-opposing powers of demons do not originate in God’s 
creation and hence the existence of demons is “improper” (522); but still nonetheless, 
they do have their origin – as everything must in Barth’s view – in the gracious and 
redemptive activity of God. This, then, is Barth’s Christian theological tragedy, according 
to which evil as nothingness is 
“chaos, the world which He did not choose or will, which He could not and did not 
create, but which, as He created the actual world, He passed over and set aside, 
marking and excluding it as the eternal past, the eternal yesterday. And this is evil 
in the Christian sense, namely, what is alien and adverse to grace, and therefore 
without it.” (353) 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has not provided a survey of discussions of evil by early twentieth-century 
Christian theologians; instead it has focused on the articulation of some of the main 
Christian theological perspectives on evil that developed in that period. Inevitably, any 
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Christian theological perspective will be a complex mixture of fidelity to Scripture and 
tradition along with a response to the context of its development. Perhaps surprisingly, 
however, the question of evil seems not to have been a particularly prominent one in 
early twentieth-century theological work, with very little innovative explicitly written on 
the topic. As such, this chapter has delved into the internal dynamics of the Christian 
perspective on evil and using Paul Ricoeur’s image of the four myths of evil has traced 
how the traditional Christian myth has been challenged and augmented in this period by 
the resurgence, for underlying cultural-historical reasons, of the three non-Christian 
myths of chaos, embodiment and tragedy. In these ways, decisively twentieth-century 
Christian perspectives on evil have emerged and something of the richness of the 
theological discussions of the question can be seen. 
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